Abstract: Prominent theories of decision under risk that challenge expected utility theory model risk attitudes at least partly with transformation of probabilities. This paper shows how attributing local risk aversion (partly or wholly) to attitudes towards probabilities can produce extreme probability distortions that imply paradoxical risk aversion. Abstract: Prominent theories of decision under risk that challenge expected utility theory model risk attitudes at least partly with transformation of probabilities. This paper shows how attributing local risk aversion (partly or wholly) to attitudes towards probabilities can produce extreme probability distortions that imply paradoxical risk aversion.
Introduction
The first paradox to challenge expected utility theory was offered by Allais (1953) . The Allais patterns violate the independence axiom, which gives the expected utility functional its idiosyncratic feature of linearity in probabilities. In order to avoid the Allais paradox, theories of decision under risk that relax the independence axiom were developed (see Starmer, 2000 for an accessible presentation).
The idea of representing risk aversion with nonlinear probability transformations originated in the psychology literature about mid-twentieth century (Preston and Baratta, 1948; Edwards, 1954) and entered the economics literature in late the seventies (Handa, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982) . Some early models of probability weighting (Handa, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) were shown to violate first order stochastic dominance. Subsequent models with rank dependence of prizes avoid that problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Quiggin, 1993) . Further development and applications of rank dependent models, and other alternatives to expected utility, have continued to the present. Wakker (2010) provides a comprehensive presentation of the literature. Rank dependent utility models have been relatively successful in explaining several behavioral 'anomalies' that have been observed in the laboratory and in the field, which accounts for their recent widespread use in field applications. This paper, however, is concerned with the implications of probabilistic sensitivity and rank dependence for risk aversion. I argue that attributing local (with respect to probabilities) risk aversion to attitudes towards probabilities can produce paradoxical risk aversion. This calls into question the ability of rank dependent utility models to rationalize risk aversion at small and large probabilities.
Risk Aversion as Attitude toward Probabilities: An Example of the Paradox
In order to provide an intuition for the main result in the paper, this section presents an illustrative example of risk-avoiding choices that provide a challenge to modeling risk preferences with probabilistic attitudes.
Suppose that an individual is offered a choice between two prospects represented by urn S g and urn R g . Urn S g contains 100 balls in the following composition: 10 white balls, g green balls and b black balls. Each white ball pays $1000, each green ball pays $4000 and each black ball pays $0. Urn R g is constructed from urn S g by replacing 10 white balls with 5 green balls and 5 black balls. Table 1 summarizes all the information on prizes and compositions of balls for the two urns. Ball composition in urn R g g+5 0 b+5 100
Thus, the decision problem the individual is facing is the choice between urn S g that offers prizes $4K, $1K and $0 with probabilities g/100, 10/100 and b/100 and a relatively riskier urn R g that offers only extreme prizes, $4K and $0 with probabilities (g+5)/100 and (b+5)/100. 1 1 Formally, for ( 5) /100 and 10 p g n    , urn R g is prospect {$4 , 0; ,1 } K p p  whereas urn S g is prospect
. All prospects R and S considered in this paper are of these types.
(1K and 4K, respectively, denote $1000 and $4000.) Figure 1 illustrates, in the probability triangle, pairs of two prospects offered by urns S g and R g for different combinations of green and black balls.
What might be the decision of our individual? Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt and Dasgupta (2012) reports that in their experiments the majority of subjects, who were asked to make similar choices as our individual, were either indifferent or preferred the safer prospect, S g over the riskier prospect R g for all compositions of green and black balls that they faced. So suppose that our individual is like the majority of subjects in the Cox et al. experiments (1) shows that the slope of the transformation of decumulative probabilities increases geometrically and therefore severe underweighting of 2 The supposition that the safer prospect is weakly preferred for all g from {0, 5, ...,90} is made here for simplicity of exposition; section 3 provides general results for cases when the weak preference for the safer urn is observed only for some subset of {0,5,…,90}. . This extreme probability distortion and subadditivity of ( )   imply preference for a sure amount of $20 over a prospect that offers $20,000
or 0 with equal probability. 5
2.b Payoff Scale Invariance
The above example uses payoffs of $4000, $1000, and $0. Inspection of statement (1) reveals that the only way in which the valuation of prizes enters the inequalities is through
Hence, irrespective of the size of payoffs (whether they are very large or very small or moderate in size), weak preference for urn S g over a range of green balls implies the same paradoxical risk aversion for any pair of payoffs with the same ratio of valuation
For example, the prizes can be $40 (for a green ball), $10 (for a white ball) and $0 (for a black ball) and risk aversion implications are similar for corresponding prizes that involve millions as long as the valuation of $40 (or $40 million) is more than twice the valuation of $10 (or $10 million). Cox et al. (2012) report an experiment conducted in Magdeburg where payoffs $40/$10/0 were used. Arguably, at these small stakes the utility should be approximately linear and therefore q is expected to be larger than 2. The estimated percentage of subjects who revealed weak preference for the three outcome lottery S i over lottery R i , (i=1,…,9) is 65% which is similar to the 72% figure reported for another experiment conducted in Calcutta with payoffs 400/80/0 in rupees. 4 The supposition that the value of $4K is more than twice the value of $1K is consistent with estimates reported in Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L'Haridon (2008) . This paper offers an appealing preference-based methods for measuring utility of (positive and negative) prizes under prospect theory; reported measurements of utility were robust to probabilities used in elicitation. In Abdellaoui et al. (2008) the reported estimated (mean) power exponent on the gain domain is 0.86. Since 4K and 1K are within the range of payoffs in their study, our numerical illustrations will build on the value of 4K being at least 3 times the value of K, which is satisfied for the power estimates in their study. 5 Verify that (20000) (0.5) 1000 (20) (0.5) (20)
where the first inequality follows from subadditivity of v(.) whereas the second inequality follows from f(0.5)<0.00098.
Paradoxical Probabilistic Sensitivity and Risk Aversion
This section contains the main result of the paper. It reports on implausible implications that follow from attributing risk-aversion (partly or wholly) to attitudes towards probabilities. All proofs are collected in the appendix. Let 1,.., 1,..,
 denote a prospect with n prizes: it pays j x with probability . j p As usual, let the outcomes be rank-ordered from best to worst. The rank dependent utility of prospect L is In words, the three outcome lottery S i pays h with probability / 2 1/ 2 , i n n  m with probability 1/n (that does not depend on i) and 0 otherwise whereas the two outcome lottery R i pays h with probability / 2 i n and 0 otherwise. Figure 1 illustrates such pairs of lotteries in the probability triangle. Note that all two-outcome lotteries, R i are on the hypotenuse whereas all three-outcome lotteries, S i lie on a line parallel with the hypotenuse at a distance 1/n. Note also that lines that join lotteries R i and S i are parallel with slope 1. So, wherever in the probability triangle indifference curves are not flatter than the 45 o line lotteries S i are weakly preferred to lotteries R i .
The theorem below states implications of a risk avoiding pattern for the transformation of probabilities and paradoxical risk aversion that follow from it. Part (a) of the theorem offers an upper bound on the difference between the transformed probabilities of any * * ( , ) p p p  and * p that follows from weak preference for S i over R i for all pairs * * (2 , 2 ) i np np N   ; that is for all pairs i with R i from a "connected" subset of the hypotenuse in the probability triangle. Part (b)
states risk aversion implications that follow from part (a).
The following standard notation is used:   for weak preference,  for strong preference, x     for the smallest integer larger than x, and x     for the largest integer smaller than x. In addition, hereafter whenever no confusion is expected symbols q and  will be used as short 
What are risk avoiding implications of a probability transformation that is this flat on the interval [0.5, 0.75]? Our individual strictly prefers a lottery that offers prizes $20 and $500,000 with equal probability to the lottery that offers $500,000 with probability 0.75 and $0 otherwise.
6
Thus, our individual would be unwilling to trade-off $20 with probability 0.5 in exchange for $500,000 with probability 0.25 and 0 with probability 0.25, which is implausible risk aversion.
Example 2: , i i
S R  for all /100 (0, 0.5). Again severe probability distortions are implied. The last inequality implies preference for a prospect that pays $100 or $0, each with probability 0.5, over a prospect that offers $2.5 million or $0 with probabilities 0.25 and 0.75 respectively.
Example 3:
,
In terms of the example in section 2 our individual weakly prefers having two white balls in the urn over replacing them with one black (increasing this way the number of black balls by one) and one green ball (increasing this way the number of green balls by one); he has this preference whenever the number of black balls in the safer urn is between 20 and 70. If ( ) 2.5 ( ) v h v m  an implication of this preference for rank dependent models is preference for a prospect that pays $1.9 million with probability 0.2, $10 with probability 0.6 or $0 with probability 0.2 over a prospect that pays $1.9 million or $0 each with probability 0.5. So, our agent would not be willing to exchange $10 with probability 0.6 for increasing the probability of getting $1.9 million from 0.2 to 0.5 when that exchange increases the probability of prize $0 from 0.2 to 0.5. implies that $100 for sure is preferred to 34 million with probability 0.1 or 0 otherwise (see row n=10, p=0.1 column in Table   2 ). Or preference for the three outcome lottery for all / 50 (0, 0.5)
implies that the even odds prospect with prizes $100 or $0 is preferred to $0.10 billion with probability 0.1 or 0 otherwise (see row n=25, most right G column in Table 2 ).
Implausibility of Modeling Risk Aversion as Attitude towards Probabilities
Previous literature has focused on the inability of expected utility theory (EUT) to rationalize some postulated patterns of choices. Allais (1953) introduced patterns of choices under risk that (if observed) refute expected utility. Allais' critique was directed at the linearity in probabilities property of the EUT functional. Rabin's (2000) patterns of risk aversion were directed at the nonlinearity in payoffs property of the EUT functional; they call into question the ability of the expected utility of terminal wealth model to rationalize risk aversion at large stakes and at small stakes.
6 Indeed, let 0.5M denote $500,000 and use subadditivity of (. 
To complete the proof it suffices to show that * * { ,..., }, k k k  
